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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Mendel owned and operated a business known as Incense Delivery. 1 Record p. 060 
(Aff. Holdaway, Ex. A, p. 18). On December 17, 2011 Idaho Falls police officers were called to 
respond to robbery. R. at 145 (Prelim. Hrg. Transcr. 5:2-5). In responding to the call, they 
ultimately ended up at Incense Delivery. Id. (Prelim. Hrg. Transcr. at 5: 10-20). While there, 
police observed what they believed to be spice products, and seized them for testing.2 Id. 
(Prelim. Hrg. Transcr. at 6:8-7:3). 
The lab test for the seized product showed the presence of AM-2201. R. at 067 to 068. 
(Aff Holdaway Ex. B). An investigation ensued that resulted in a controlled buy and ultimately 
the arrest and charges in the present case R at 051 to 065 (Aff Holdaway Ex. A). The sole 
chemical at issue throughout the investigation is AM-2201. R. 067 to 068. 
A preliminary hearing was held on February 21, 2012 before the Honorable L. Mark 
Riddoch. R. at 141 to 167. During that preliminary hearing a Criminalistic Analysis Report was 
put into evidence in which the lab technician, Scott Hellstrom, purported that the substance AM-
2201 was a controlled substance. R. at 067 to 068 and 146 to 14 7 (Prelim. Hrg. T ranscr. 9:21-
14:23). Mr. Hellstrom was not produced for cross examination and the portion of the lab test 
purporting the chemical was a controlled substance was objected to. See id. That objection was 
overruled and the report in its entirety was entered into evidence. Id. 
1 For purposes of this appeal the Defendant adopts the facts as alleged and reported by the State. 
2 The terms spice, potpourri, and herbal incense are interchangeable terms and generally refer to 
a plant material that has been mixed with a chemical, one of which is the chemical in question in 
this case. 
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Also at the preliminary hearing, the Defendant sought to introduce testimony by way of 
Dr. Karl De Jesus. R. at 163 (Prelim. Hrg. Transcr. 77:8-9). Dr. De Jesus was prepared to testify 
as an expert concerning the chemical properties of AM-2201 as compared to the language of the 
statutes allegedly covering that chemical (LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a)). Id. (Prelim. Hrg. Transcr. 
77:10-17 and 79:21-80:7). Upon objection by the State, the court refused to permit testimony 
from Dr. De Jesus because it concluded the issue raised by Dr. De Jesus's expected testimony 
was a "factual issue for the jury." R. at 164 (Tr. 82: 17-83:7). Despite its conclusion that the issue 
was a factual one, the court opined that the Defendant could raise his issue by motion to dismiss 
and/or a motion in limine, both of which are matters that would go before a judge and not a jury. 
Id. After the court denied the Defendant the opportunity to put his witness on the stand, the court 
concluded there was sufficient evidence to bind over the Defendant. 
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that, as a matter of law, AM-2201 
was not a controlled substance under Idaho law.3 R. at 029. 
The history of the regulation of "spice" chemicals in Idaho is as follows: On October 15, 
2010 Governor Otter signed into law a rule promulgated by the Idaho Board of Pharmacy in the 
previous month. The rule made it illegal to possess, manufacture, or distribute some chemicals 
that had been used to make "spice," specifically: CP 47,497, HU-210, JWH-018, JWH-073, 
JWH-200, JWH-081, and JWH-250. On March 10, 2011, House Bill 139 was signed into law. 
3 The Idaho Legislature amended the relevant statute in 2012 and struck the language at issue in 
the present case and replaced it with the language "to any extent." 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 181 
(hereinafter HB 502). Had the language used in HB 502 been in effect at the time of Mr. 
Mendel's possession he would concede the language prohibited AM-2201. 
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Whereas the Board of Pharmacy Rule prohibited chemicals by name, HB 139 prohibited 
substances by describing groups of chemicals, and further prohibited certain chemical alterations 
to the prohibited chemicals (analogues). 
Before HB 139 was signed into law, many in the "spice" industry began looking for 
chemicals that would be compliant with the language contained in HB 139. The language of HB 
139 was available, and prior to its passage the language was passed along to Dr. Richard Parent 
along with a list of potential chemical candidates for use in "spice. R. at 094 to 097. After 
comparing the language of the bill with the chemical structures of the list provided to him, Dr. 
Parent was able to determine that some chemicals were not covered by the language of HB 13 9. 
Id. Specifically, Dr. Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered by the language. Id. 
This information soon became common knowledge throughout Idaho, and many spice 
products began using AM-2201 even before March 10, 2011. To ensure compliance with the 
law, many manufacturers and distributors would get their base chemicals tested to ensure that 
they were not "dirty" (i.e. containing chemicals covered under HB 139). See id. This had to be 
done since one cannot tell by simply looking at a chemical what the chemical is, just as one 
cannot look at a "spice" product and know with what, if any, chemical or chemicals the plant 
matter has been treated. 
The State believes that AM-2201 was a controlled substance in December 2011 and 
makes no distinction between AM-2201 and other prohibited substances. The Defendant 
disagrees and thus filed his motion to dismiss based on the contention that AM-2201 was legal in 
the State of Idaho at the time he possessed it. 
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To conserve the resources and time of both the Defendant and the State, the parties 
stipulated that no hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss would be held and the Court would 
delay ruling on the motion because the same issue (the legality of AM-2201 under the 2011 
version of the statute) was in the process of being heard in another district court, in State v. 
Morgan Alley Ada County District Court Case No. CR FE 11-15482. The Alley case is now 
before this court on appeal, and has been assigned Supreme Court Docket No. 40428. The 
record in Alley and Sauers constituted the basis for the District Court's ruling in this case. R. at 
200. 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss in Alley, the defendant in that case presented 
expert testimony from two doctors of organic chemistry. They both testified that AM-2201 has a 
structure that substantially differs from the structures prohibited by Idaho Code 37 § 
2705(d)(30)(a), and thus, is not a controlled substance under Idaho Law. 
Specifically, Dr. Owen McDougal testified, "The chain itself [in AM-2201] is an alkyl 
halide. So it has the fluorine as a functional group off of the hydrocarbon chain. In the statute it 
specifies an alkyl group. Alkyl groups are nothing but carbon and hydrogen. When you add a 
halogen or some other hetero atom, like oxygen or nitrogen [or fluorine], you create functionality 
in the molecule, and it becomes a different class of compound." Alley Tr. of Hearing on Motion 
to Dismiss, pp 39-40 (emphasis added). Likewise, Dr. DeJesus testified that AM-2201 has a 
"flouro-alkane chain" and is thus not an alkyl group, see Alley Tr. pp. 118 to 125, and that, "[I]n 
the case of substitution other than carbon, such as the one that we are dealing with in this case 
right here [AM-2201], it then becomes another functional group. It is no longer an alkyl group." 
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Alley Tr. pp. 131. 
Despite this testimony, the District Court in Alley denied the motion on the basis that in 
passing HB 139, the legislature intended to ban chemicals used in "spice", that is, those that 
mimic the "hallucinatory effects" of marijuana. Alley R. at 000308. The District Court turned to 
legislative intent without having ever found any portion of the statute to be vague, ambiguous, or 
in conflict with other law. Alley R. at 297-318. Furthermore, the District Court interpreted the 
legislative intent as applying to the pharmacological effects of certain substances without regard 
to actions of the legislature suggesting precisely the opposite. Id. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Defendant argues that the judgment of conviction should be overturned 
because the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was in error. Defendant maintains 
that AM-2201 was not prohibited by the relevant statutory language in place at the time of the 
alleged offense (which has since been amended to be broader and now unarguably prohibits AM-
2201), specifically: 
a) The district court in Alley, upon whose ruling the court in this case based its decision, 
improperly turned to legislative intent in interpreting Idaho Code§ 2705(d)(30)(a); 
b) The district court improperly considered the alleged effects of AM-2201 in interpreting 
§ 2705(d)(30)(a); 
c) § 2705(d)(30)(a) is not ambiguous and does not prohibit AM-2201; and 
d) In the alternative, to the extent§ 2705(d)(30)(a) is ambiguous, the district court should 
have applied the rule of lenity, and if it had done so, it should have concluded that 
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2705(d)(30)(a) does not prohibit AM-2201. 
ARGUMENT 
The question of whether a substance is designated in the Controlled Substance Act as a 
controlled substance is a question of law for the court. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 262 
( 1980); State v. Kellog, 102 Idaho 628 (1981 ). As such, appellate review is de novo. See State v. 
Doe, 92 P. 3d 521, 523-24; 140 Idaho 271 (2004). 
A. The Court improperly resorted to examining legislative history without first 
determining whether the statutory language was ambiguous. 
In interpreting statutory language, a court must give the words their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning. Where statutory language is not ambiguous, the court should not consult 
legislative history or other extrinsic evidence. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (citing City ofSun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 
665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). In its order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
indictment, the District Court judge cited the language in Verska prohibiting it from resorting to 
legislative history if it determined the statute's plain language was unambiguous. 
Despite its correct recitation of the law with regard to statutory interpretation, the District 
Court then proceeded to resort to legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended LC. 
§ 37-2705(d)(30) to prohibit AM-2201. The Court's reliance on legislative intent is evidenced by 
the Court's framing of the issue when it asked, "what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule 
I?" Alley R. at 300 and 304. The Court then turned to the entirety of LC. § 37-2705(d) and 
concluded that "[b]y stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly 
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ease to discern the intention of the legislature[.]" Alley R. at 306. Other language evidencing the 
Court's reliance on the legislative intent includes, "[t]he minutes of the legislative committees," 
"the Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to 
Schedule L." and "[i]t was the intent of the legislature." Alley R. at 308 (emphasis added). 
Based on the legislative history, the Court concluded that the legislature "unambiguously 
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and did so in broad language that 
encompasses AM-2201." Alley R. at 307-08. That is, the District Court ultimately concluded 
that the statute was unambiguous, but reached its conclusion that the language in I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30) prohibiting "THC 'and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with 
similar chemical structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic 
the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" by resorting to legislative history. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in resorting to legislative history first, and then 
using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous language of the statute prohibited 
AM-2201. 
What is more is that in making its analysis the District Court omitted any discussion of, 
or consideration for, other acts of the legislature when passing HB 139. Specifically, the removal 
of certain language from the relevant section of the code. The language that was removed looked 
expressly at the pharmacological effects of a substance. The remaining language referred only to 
the structural elements of the substance in question. 
The version of Idaho Code § 37-2705(d)(30) that was m place pnor to the 2011 
legislative passage of House Bill 139 read: 
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Tetrahydrocannabinols. Synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or 
in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and 
their isomers with similar chemical structure and pharmacological activity such as the 
following: 
LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30)(2010)(emphasis added). 
The 2011 House Bill 139 that added subsection (ii)(a), which was the subject of the 
arguments before this Court, also removed from I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) the term 
"pharmacological activity" so that it now reads: 
Tetrahydrocannabinols--or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, 
or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, 
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following: 
LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30)(201 l)(emphasis added). 
The removal of the language "pharmacological activity" is quite telling as it creates a 
plain reading of the statute that does not take into consideration the pharmacological or 
hallucinogenic effects a given substance may have. A plain reading of the relevant section of 
statute now requires looking solely at the structural elements of a substance in determining if it 
contained within the purview of the statute. 
Indeed, the removal of the pharmacological reference in subsection (30) makes the statute 
more consistent with the language being added under subsection (30) in that all of the language 
contained in the subsections of (30) is entirely structural related. Those subsections, such as 
subsection (30)(a)--the subsection in question in the present case--describe naphthyls, indoles, 
nitrogen atoms on the indole ring, alkyls, alkenyls, cycloalkylmethyls, and cycloalkylethyls. All 
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of those describe structures and not pharmacological effects of a given substance. Even more 
compelling is considering how fine a point is placed on the structural descriptions. The sole 
difference between an alkyl and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between 
two carbon atoms. Alley Tr. at 40:22-42:9. The only difference between the cycloalkylmethyls 
and cycloalkylethyls is the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms present. Alley Tr. at 
43:2-44:3. For the legislature to break do\Vn structural descriptions to the point of discerning 
between a single bond and double bond or a single carbon atom is indicative of a severe focus on 
structure and not effect. 
The result is that while the district court should not have considered the legislative history 
in reaching its conclusion even where it did consider such history it did not account for the 
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and extreme focus on 
structure. For both reasons the district court's decision was improper and should be overturned. 
B. The Court's determination that I.C. § 37-2705(d) prohibits all "synthetic 
substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" was error. 
The proper procedure would have been to begin by examining the plain language of LC. 
§ 37-2705(d)(30), which defines tetrahydrocannabinol, "synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis," and, as relevant here, 
"synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure [to THC]" as 
Schedule I drugs. Had the District Court followed this procedure, it would not have concluded 
that the statute prohibits all "synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of 
marijuana," because the statutory language states that it is prohibiting substances with "similar 
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chemical structure" to tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the pnmary psychoactive chemical m 
marijuana) and other synthetic equivalents of the chemicals contained in marijuana. 
The District Court reached its erroneous conclusion by determining that, in enacting LC. 
§ 37-2705(d)(30), the legislature was attempting to prohibit "spice" (plant matter combined with 
chemicals that have similar effects to THC or marijuana), and concluding that the list of 
prohibited chemical structures following the language "such as" in LC. § 37-2705(d)(30) was 
provided merely by way of example and thus could not narrow the language preceding the words 
"such as." 
The District Court was correct in concluding that the plain meaning of "such as" is that 
whatever list follows, it is non-exhaustive. However, the fact that the statute does not 
specifically list every chemical it prohibits does not render the list meaningless. In determining 
the meaning of a statute, courts must give effect to all the words of the statute so that none will 
be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant. Hillside Landscape Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 
151 Idaho 749, 264 P.3d 388 (2011) (citing State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 
309 (2006)). Presumably, the legislature did not expend time and resources drafting a list of 
prohibited chemicals idly, but rather to instruct the courts as to what it meant by "similar 
chemical structure." See Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 963 P.2d 1168, 131 Idaho 731 (1998) (non-
exhaustive list added to statute by amendment "clarified the language" of the statute). 
Moreover, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, non-exhaustive lists can and, 
indeed, do narrow the general language they explain. See State v. Cobb, 969 P.2d 244, 132 
Idaho 195 (1998) (disturbing the peace ordinance survived constitutional vagueness challenge 
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because it included a non-exclusive list of examples of proscribed conduct). It is a rule of 
statutory construction that "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or 
things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class 
or character to those specifically enumerated." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850, 
854 (2001). According to this rule, to determine whether AM-2201 was included within the 
general term "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure 
[to THC]," the District Court should have considered whether AM-2201 is of a like or similar 
class, character, and severity to those classes of chemical structures specifically enumerated. 
See, e.g., State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087, 139 Idaho 482 (2003) (criminal statute using a 
non-exclusive list does not prohibit conduct of similar class and character but lesser severity); 
Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 684 P. 2d 268, 106 Idaho 866 (1984) (non-exhaustive list of 
recreational activities that included "pleasure driving" also encompassed motorcycling for 
pleasure because it was sufficiently similar to the activities listed). 
Further, the examples included in a non-exhaustive list can also narrow the definition of 
another listed example. In Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd., 159 P.3d 896, 901 (Idaho 
2007), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether email correspondence 
between a public employee and her supervisor was covered by the personnel records exemption 
from disclosure under the state's public records act. The act did not define "personnel records" 
but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of exempt personnel records. Although one of the 
listed examples was "correspondence" and the Court acknowledged that the emails were a type 
of correspondence, it held that "in context, it becomes clear that . . . only those types of 
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correspondence typically found in a personnel file [are exempt] ... [the emails] are informal 
communications between an employee and her supervisor, unrelated to personnel 
administration." Id. at 902. That is, even though "correspondence" was specifically included in 
a non-exclusive list, the Court held that, in context, the meaning of "correspondence" was 
narrowed by the other items included in the list. 
Here, the District Court refused to undertake this analysis. Rather, it improperly 
examined the legislative history to determine that the statute was intended to "deal with the so-
called 'spice' problem" and thus interpreted the general language as prohibiting all substances 
that could have similar hallucinatory effects to marijuana, regardless of their lack of similarity to 
the chemical structures listed in the statute with regard to structure or potency. Rather than 
engage in the kind of statutory interpretation required by Idaho's case law, the District Court 
rendered the legislature's non-exhaustive list meaningless. 
Indeed, the non-exhaustive list provided in the code includes subsections (a) through (i), 
most of which contained yet another list within them. For example, subsection (a) contains a 
subset list of "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-( 4-morpholinyl)ethyl." As 
with any other words in the statute these words too, must be given effect and cannot be rendered 
superfluous or meaningless. 
Nevertheless, the district court's opinion does not consider itself with the meaning and 
application of those terms or what purpose they serve in the overall application of the statute. Yet 
they do serve a purpose. That purpose is to place context and limits to the applicability of the 
statute. Those words denote very specific chemical structures that are intended to fall within the 
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purview of the statute. In short, they define the scope of the statute. 
Where a chemical falls outside of the type and nature being described by those terms it by 
definition falls outside of the list of chemicals expressly covered in the statute. As noted by Dr. 
McDougal, the chemical AM-2201 does not just fall outside of the scope of chemicals described 
in subsection (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is in a different "class" altogether. Alley Tr. at 39:9-40:6. It is this 
structural separation between AM-2201 and the chemicals described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) that places 
AM-2201 outside of the scope of the statute and therefore legal under the law in effect at the 
time. Because the district court looked solely to similarity in pharmacological effect and 
disregards the limiting nature of the structural descriptions in the statute the decision of the 
district court should be reversed. 
C. AM-2201 is not included among the substances prohibited by I.C. § 37-270S(d) 
A correct statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that AM-2201 is not a prohibited 
substance. As noted by the District Court, LC. § 37-2705(d)(30), unlike other sections of LC. § 
37-2705, does not prohibit specific chemicals. Rather, it prohibits "[t]etrahydrocannabinols or 
synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in . . . Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic 
substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:" 
There are two subsections, the first of which prohibits THC and its optical isomers, and the 
second of which prohibits "the following synthetic drugs" and then lists in each of its sub-
subsections "any compound structurally derived from" one of six chemicals "by substitution at 
the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-( 4-
morpholinyl)ethy l, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or 
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not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent." 
In the present context the "non-exhaustive" list is exceptionally narrow. The differences 
between the examples are the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms ( cycloalkylmethyl or 
cycloalkylethyl), the number of bonds between carbon atoms (alkenyls), and the length of a 
hydrogen and carbon chain (alkyls). I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a). All the examples hinge around 
differences in chemical chains containing only hydrogen and carbon. Consequently, at the 
molecular level, all non-hydrogen and carbon chains fall outside the list. Otherwise, one would 
expect that the list would have covered non-hydrogen and carbon type substituents.4 Due to the 
highly technical, specific, and minute distinctions between the examples, this Court should take 
great caution in applying the "such as" language beyond the types of examples provided. AM-
2201 is not of the type listed because it contains a non-hydrogen and carbon atom substituent. 
It should be noted here that the district court never made any findings as whether AM-
2201 was expressly covered by the language in ( d)(30)(ii)( a). The district court rested almost 
/ 
entirely on the language contained in (d)(30) and on its conclusions that AM-2201 allegedly 
exhibits pharmacological effects similar to THC. As such, to the extent this Court addresses the 
issue of whether AM-2201 is described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is doing so independent of the 
conclusions of the district court. 
4The code was amended in 2012 to accomplish precisely this, as it removed the language limiting 
the examples to alkyls, alkenyls, etc., and replaced that language with "to any extent," thereby 
including all possible constituents in the example list. Compare LC. § 37-3705(d)(30)(a) (2011) 
and 37-2705(d)(30)(a) (2012). 
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D. To the extent the statute is ambiguous as to whether AM-2201 is prohibited, the 
rule of lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Defendants' favor. 
The rule of lenity, as applied to criminal statutes, requires that any ambiguity should be 
strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App. 
1998); see also Capital Care Ctr. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776, 
(1997). In construing statutory language in the criminal code, the court in Herrera-Brito held 
that "(a]n act cannot be held criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears from the language 
used that the legislature so intended." Id. at 3 87 (emphasis supplied). The order of the language 
in that quote is essential to the proper application of the rule of lenity. The Court should not look 
to, or apply, legislative intent. Rather, the language of the statute itself must make evident the 
intent of the legislature to criminalize the specific conduct of the accused. 
This distinction is further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
[ w ]hile the appellant may be correct that it was the legislative intent to deter not only a 
person who actually possesses a gun, but all principals involved in a crime in which a 
dangerous weapon was employed, we cannot make such an interpretation for the 
legislature when no such intention appears from the language of the statute. To hold 
otherwise would be supplying what the legislature left vague and this we cannot do. 
State v. Morrison, 143 Idaho 459, 461 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Thompson, 101 
Idaho 430, 438 (1980) (emphasis supplied). 
Indeed, in Alorrison the Court of Appeals found that the legislative history supported the State' s 
position but concluded it was bound by the "admonition in Thompson that the intention of the 
statute must appear in its language" in order to comport with the rule of lenity. Morrison, 143 
Idaho at 461. 
Any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the Defendant. See also 
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McNally v. US, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). To the extent the District Court relied upon extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent to determine the legal status of AM-2201, it has essentially already 
implicitly concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous in this regard. The District Court's 
failure to explicitly recognize this ambiguity and to construe it in favor of the Defendant was 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of conviction entered in this case should be VACATED, because it was 
based on Defendant's plea of guilty, which was conditional upon the District Court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on an error of law. Specifically, the District 
Court erred in determining that AM-2201 was, at the relevant time, a controlled substance under 
Idaho law. Specifically, the court erred by examining legislative history without first finding a 
statutory ambiguity, by resorting to the alleged effects of AM-2201 rather than limiting its 
analysis to the chemical's structure, and by either failing to correctly interpret the statute's 
unambiguous language or, in the alternative, failing to apply the rule of lenity to interpret 
ambiguous language in Defendant's favor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of March, 2013. 
Ryan Holdaway 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of March 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 W. State St. 
PO Box 83720 
Boise. ID 83720-0101 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson St. 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8071 
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